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Abstract 
Low interest rates in advanced economies contributed to massive private 
capital flows around the world in search of higher rates on investment in 
the final decades of the past century and the beginning of this one. 
Emerging market economies in Europe became an attractive destination 
for significant amounts of that capital, most notably foreign direct 
investment, given their political and economic reforms, including opening 
up and liberalization of their capital accounts. Closing the gap between 
domestic saving and investment in those countries the FDI received 
helped improve the growth performance of those economies. However, it 
also contributed to the formation of large current account deficits. The 
global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 changed the push 
factors in the advanced economies and the previously abundant capital 
flows to the emerging European economies slowed down significantly. 
That immediately affected the growth rates but the current account 
deficits remained large.    
The aim of this paper is to investigate how the emerging European 
economies reacted to the sudden stop in international capital flows and 
what are the consequences. The inspiration is to look at the Asian 
economies that after their financial crisis of 1997-1998 emerged stronger 
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than before, running persistent current account surpluses and becoming 
major creditors in the world. The analysis is based on the IMF World and 
Regional Economic Outlook databases, the Eurostat, the Asian 
Development Bank sources and the National Banks' data in European 
countries.  
Keywords: international capital flows, financial liberalization, emerging 




 One of the most salient features of the global economy in the past two 
decades has been the emergence of a group of low to middle income countries in 
Asia, Europe, and Latin America that comprise around 40 percent of world's 
population. With their high rates of growth they asserted themselves as players 
with an increasing role in the world market. Coupled with the rapid global trade 
and financial integration since mid-1980s, the emerging markets’ share in the 
world’s gross domestic product (GDP) has risen steadily from just about 17 
percent in the 1960s to close to 40 percent in 2009. Their contribution to world 
output growth rose from 30 percent in the 1973-1985  to 47 percent in 1986-2007. 
For comparison, the advanced economies’ share in the world output growth in the 
observed periods fell from 60 to 49 percent (IMF, 2010). To a large extent it was 
the emerging markets’ growth, particularly in Asia, that led the world out of the 
global recession in 2008-2009. This has caused a shift in economic power in the 
world economy.  
 Emerging economies in Europe and those in Asia share a lot of common 
characteristics. In addition to prospects for high growth it is their market 
dynamism due to economic and political reforms or transition to a market 
economy, higher risks and returns than advanced economies, and usually high 
volatility. The similarities were greater before the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
1998, when Asian emerging economies ran current account deficits, had 
insufficiently developed domestic financial systems, and experienced massive 
capital inflows with a pronounced short term component. The European emerging 
economies displayed similar characteristics before they were hit by a different 
crisis, the one in 2008-2009. However, the crisis proved devastating for most of 
the European emerging economies because, unlike their Asian counterparts,  they 
were not in the position to deal with the consequences of the built up large 
external vulnerabilities that exploded with the sudden stop in capital inflows.  
Growth in Asian emerging economies, however, resumed shortly after the 
financial crisis 1997-1998 and intensified later on. The global financial crisis 
2008-2009 caused the Asian emerging market economies’ growth to slow down 
only a little bit. The emerging European economies displayed high growth rates 
before the crisis 2008-2009 but the recovery from the deep recession the crisis 
caused is very slow and uneven.  
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The aim of this paper is to compare the two groups of emerging market 
economies and learn what lessons the European emerging economies can draw in 
terms of policy choices and structural changes that were responsible for the Asian 
emerging economies’ quick and impressive recovery from the financial crisis in 
1997-1998 as well as how that translates into their remarkable resilience to the 
detrimental effects of the latest global financial crisis in 2008-2009 and potential 
recovery in 2010. Our focus rests mainly on the smaller Asian emerging market 
economies that are comparable in size and to some extent structure to the 
European emerging economies. However, we included also China that, due to its 
size, is almost as much of an outlier in Asia as Poland is in Europe. 
Consequently, in the first group of countries that we call Asia 6 we look at China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand. The second group we call 
Europe 11 and it is made up of the 10 latest members of the European Union 
(namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Romania and Croatia (since it will 
become a member on July 1, 2013).   
 The paper consists of four parts. In the first part we document the pre-
crises similarities between the two groups of countries as well as their 
differences. The second part elaborates on the Asian financial crisis, the reactions 
of the Asian emerging economies, and their results. Part three describes the 
conditions in Europe and the reactions and results of the European emerging 
economies. The fourth and concluding section summarizes the lessons that could 
be learned from the Asian experience and actions that could help the European 
emerging economies lead themselves out of the current recession and embark 
again on the high rates of growth for which they have the potential.  
 
 
2. PRE-CRISIS EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES IN 
ASIA AND EUROPE: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES 
 In early 1990s Asian emerging economies were undergoing a transition 
to market economies much like the European emerging economies after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989. In both groups restructuring and reforms were happening 
against the backdrop of a not yet well developed, mostly bank-centric financial 
system. Also, emerging market economies on both continents developed similar 
characteristics right before „their“ crisis hit them, only about ten years apart, such 
as experiencing rapid growth, large capital inflows, current account deficits, 
rising external and internal debt, inflexible exchange rate regimes.  
Rates of real GDP growth are shown in Chart 1. While growth rates in 
Asia have gone unsurpassed, the European emerging economies experienced first 
a transitional recession at the onset of economic and political reforms in early 
1990s reflecting major reallocation of resources and restructuring.  
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Chart 1 Real GDP Growth Rates in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (period average) 
Source: IMF-IFS, March 2012 
 
Even during the worst of the Asian financial crisis, growth in the Asian 
emerging economies did not fall drastically. It also rebound very quickly and 
once the crisis was over it took off at an impressive scale again. Growth in the 
European emerging economies did not show such elasticity. Rates of GDP 
growth were not as high as the Asian ones even during the best of times and once 
they plunged during the global financial crisis, they either remained low or are 
still in the negative territory. An especially dramatic example and exception is 
Latvia whose growth rate before the crisis 2008-09 soared to more than 10 
percent only to plunge down to -10.5 percent when the crisis hit. 
 As is shown in Chart 2, both groups of countries in the pre-crisis periods 
also ran current account deficits, some quite pronounced such as in Thailand and 
Malaysia, -7.1 percent of GDP. Korea, and the Philippines had a somewhat lower 
current account deficits of  -2.1 and -3.5 percent of GDP respectively. The picture 
was not homogeneous, however. For instance, Singapore ran record current 
account surpluses of 15.4 percent of GDP in the year preceding the crisis and the 
first year of the Asian financial crisis.  


















































ASIA 6 EUROPE 11
Chart 2 Current Account Balances in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (period average, as % 
of GDP) 1994-2010 
Source: IMF-WEO, April 2012 
 
In Europe the average current account deficits in the pre-crisis periods 
were -9.4 percent of GDP with the Baltic states and Bulgaria and Romania 
running exceptionally high ones like -19.2 in Latvia or -18.2 in Bulgaria. 
 Rates of investment to GDP prior to 1997 were big, at least 1/3 of GDP, 
and in some countries like China, Korea, and Malaysia even higher. In Europe 
prior to 2008 they were a little lower but also in the 1/3 of GDP range, and 
especially high in Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria.  Chart 3 shows total investment 
in Asia 6 and Europe 11. 
Chart 3 Total Investment in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
Source: IMF-WEO, April 2012 



















































ASIA 6 EUROPE 11
Domestic savings to GDP were almost twice as high in Asia than in Europe in 
their pre-crisis periods. They ranged from 41.5 percent GDP in China to 26.0 
percent in the Philippines.  European rates of domestic savings to GDP averaged 
at 29.1 percent (Chart 4). 
Chart 4 Gross National Savings in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
Source: IMF-WEO, April 2012 
 
In the early 1990s both push and pull factors activated a large volume of 
capital flows to emerging markets in both regions. Low interest rates and returns 
in advanced economies on one hand and strong growth prospects with growing 
degree of financial openness and profitability of firms in emerging markets 
generated massive cross-border capital inflows into both regions. Capital inflows 
to emerging market economies of Asia and Europe are shown in Chart 5.  
Chart 5. Total Capital Inflows in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
* missing data for Slovenia 1994, Slovak Republic 2001 and some categories for Malaysia 2010, 
replaced by zeroes during calculation of period averages 
Source: IMF-IFS & IMF-WEO, April 2012 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXII. (2013.) BR. 1. (275-296)                   Sohinger, J., Galinec, D.: VOLATILITY... 
281 
 The composition of capital inflows expressed as percent of GDP in pre-
crises periods in both regions reveals the nature of the external vulnerabilities that 
developed over time. The following three tables illustrate the shares of foreign 
direct investment, portfolio, and other investments in the total capital inflows to 
both regions. 
Table 1.  
FDI Inflows in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
1994-1996 1997-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 2010
ASIA 6 3,7 4,7 3,7 5,9 5,2 5,8
China 11,8 10,3 8,7 14,1 12,8 14,0
Indonesia 2,0 1,0 -0,9 2,0 1,4 1,9
Korea 0,3 1,0 1,1 0,4 0,3 0,0
Malaysia 5,1 4,0 3,1 3,8 2,0 3,9
Philippines 1,9 2,3 1,3 2,0 1,0 0,9
Thailand 1,2 4,6 3,7 4,6 2,5 3,0
EUROPE 11 2,7 4,1 4,8 8,5 5,8 -1,3
Bulgaria 1,0 4,4 7,7 23,2 13,2 4,9
Croatia 1,1 3,5 5,3 6,4 6,9 0,7
Czech Republic 3,3 4,0 7,5 6,2 2,2 3,4
Estonia 5,8 7,8 7,0 14,7 8,6 8,1
Hungary 6,8 7,9 5,3 25,4 25,1 -32,9
Latvia 5,2 6,8 3,6 7,0 2,2 1,5
Lithuania 1,4 5,9 3,5 5,1 2,1 2,0
Poland 2,4 3,4 3,7 4,9 2,9 1,9
Romania 1,0 4,1 3,8 7,2 4,9 1,8
Slovak Republic* 1,5 1,7 6,2 5,7 1,7 0,6
Slovenia 0,7 1,3 2,4 2,1 1,1 0,8  
* missing data for Slovak Republic 2001, replaced by zeroes during calculation of period averages 
Source: IMF-IFS & IMF-WEO, April 2012 
 
 As data in Table 1 show, the FDI inflows in both regions were 
significant at all times. In Asia they did not falter even during the crisis. In fact, 
they even grew and slowed down by only a little bit in the year immediately after 
the crisis. In Europe, however, the drop in FDI the year following the crisis was 
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Table 2.  
Portfolio Investment Inflows in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
1994-1996 1997-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 2010
ASIA 6 2,0 0,8 1,2 2,4 0,9 2,8
China 0,7 1,0 0,9 3,0 1,7 2,4
Indonesia 2,1 -1,6 0,1 1,9 1,3 2,2
Korea 2,8 1,4 2,3 1,8 1,5 4,1
Malaysia* -1,0 0,1 0,5 2,1 -3,2 0,0
Philippines 3,3 0,1 1,5 3,7 -0,7 4,9
Thailand 2,1 1,7 0,0 2,6 0,0 2,7
EUROPE 11 1,1 1,2 1,8 1,6 1,1 3,5
Bulgaria -0,6 0,3 1,5 1,3 -0,6 -0,2
Croatia 0,9 1,4 2,7 0,2 0,8 1,5
Czech Republic 2,1 1,9 1,7 0,8 1,4 3,7
Estonia 1,6 4,2 4,2 -3,1 -4,2 -1,0
Hungary 3,3 1,0 3,4 4,5 -1,3 0,4
Latvia 0,1 -0,1 1,4 0,7 0,2 -0,1
Lithuania 0,7 0,7 2,4 2,1 2,8 6,7
Poland 0,3 0,9 1,7 1,8 1,4 5,7
Romania 0,2 0,9 0,2 0,6 0,2 1,1
Slovak Republic* 0,8 2,1 2,1 1,0 1,8 2,1
Slovenia* 1,0 0,9 0,6 1,8 7,4 6,7  
* missing data for Slovenia 1994, Slovak Republic 2001 and some categories for Malaysia 2010, 
replaced by zeroes during calculation of period averages 
Source: IMF-IFS & IMF-WEO, April 2012 
 
Portfolio investments, both debt and equity (Table 2), didn't show great 
oscillations or dramatic change in both regions, other than would be expected in 
the pre- and post-crisis times. However, „other“ investments (Table 3) that 
contain the element of short-term debt show an increase in Asia shortly before its 
crisis in 1997. They also rose significantly in Europe in their pre-crisis period.   
Table 3.  
Other Investment Inflows in Asia 6 and Europe 11 (as % of GDP) 1994-2010 
1994-1996 1997-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007 2008-2009 2010
ASIA 6 2,9 -2,6 -0,3 3,3 0,4 5,5
China 0,5 0,5 1,7 6,0 1,7 14,2
Indonesia 0,1 -4,5 -1,5 -0,6 0,7 0,6
Korea 3,7 -3,1 -0,3 3,5 -0,5 -0,5
Malaysia* 0,4 1,1 0,6 -1,4 -0,9 0,0
Philippines 5,2 1,4 -0,8 0,8 -1,8 2,5
Thailand 8,3 -14,0 -6,5 1,5 -0,5 5,1
EUROPE 11 1,1 2,2 2,3 6,9 4,0 0,6
Bulgaria -3,6 -1,5 3,1 12,5 9,6 -3,1
Croatia 2,3 5,7 6,3 8,2 6,8 0,0
Czech Republic 9,4 2,6 0,8 2,8 1,3 0,6
Estonia 5,0 8,4 5,2 20,5 1,3 -7,1
Hungary -1,7 0,6 3,4 8,4 10,5 -0,8
Latvia 10,1 7,5 11,9 29,8 0,7 0,9
Lithuania 7,2 6,2 3,1 13,2 -0,5 -8,0
Poland -3,4 1,4 1,0 3,2 3,5 2,8
Romania 2,3 0,6 3,5 9,3 2,9 1,0
Slovak Republic* 5,3 7,5 -0,2 4,8 7,2 1,4
Slovenia 1,8 1,7 4,9 17,0 -1,8 -7,5  
* missing data for Slovak Republic 2001 and some categories for Malaysia 2010, replaced by zeroes 
during calculation of period averages 
Source: IMF-IFS & IMF-WEO, April 2012 
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The dominance of short-term credit in the Asian economies generated 
pressures on domestic financial system that they could not sustain without a 
major realignment whereas the painful dependence on foreign equity flows to 
finance their growth destabilized the European emerging economies when those 
funds stopped flowing in.  
Consequently, both groups of countries were in fundamental ways 
vulnerable to a sudden stop and/or reversal of the capital flows that inevitably 
accompanied „their“ crises. For the Asian economies that happened in 1997 and 
for the European economies it came in 2008. 
 
 
3. THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 The early warning signs of a crisis about to happen in Asian economies 
did not show in their textbook form. Current account deficits were present but not 
glaring. Also, most budgets in the region were either balanced or nearly balanced. 
There was slow inflation and manageable government debt. Before the Asian 
financial crisis a lot of attention was paid to the government external finances as a 
possible source of instability while private debt stocks were for most part 
neglected. However, given the large amonts of private capital flows that got 
generated in the 1980s the significance of that aspect of international finance 
increased hugely. 
The pegged exchange rates coupled with heavy inflows of foreign capital 
produced inevitable tensions as the open economy trilemma would suggest 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998). The exchange rate regimes differed some across the 
region. For instance, Indonesia and Korea had more flexible (crawling) pegs than 
Malaysia and Thailand (Eichengreen – Leblang, 2002). But there was not enough 
exchange rate flexibility for them to prepare the economies to the changing 
environment. 
Massive capital inflows raised the general level of liquidity by creating 
large lending booms that, in turn, led to high corporate debt-to-equity ratios. As 
Table 4 shows, in Thailand  debt-to-equity ratio was a high 236 percent while in 
Korea it was even higher and measured 355 percent. In 1997 those numbers 
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Table 4.  
Selected Indicators of Corporate Financing* in Asia 6 in 1996 
 Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Ratio of short-
term to Total 
Debt 
ASIA 6 1,97 0,58 
China & Hong Kong 1,56 0,60 
Indonesia 1,88 0,54 
Korea 3,55 0,57 
Malaysia 1,18 0,64 
Philippines 1,29 0,48 
Thailand 2,36 0,63 
Note: Data are derived from a sample of 5,550 Asian firms. 
Source: Claessens, Djankov & and Lang (1998) 
 
In the Asian economies prior to its crisis private banks and non-financial 
companies borrowed large amounts from foreign banks, predominantly in US 
dollars, and their governments implicitly guaranteed those loans thus turning 
private debt stocks into public liabilities. At the same time domestic banks were 
lending to domestic companies in local currencies. Consequently, liabilities were 
denominated in US dollars and assets mostly in domestic currency. This created 
great mismatches in the currency denomination of external and internal debt.  
Moreover, in the first half of 1997 capital flows did not slow down but 
increasingly took the form of short-term interbank loans. Consequently, liabilities 
were predominantly short-term and assets for most part were long-term or 
illiquid. This added significant maturity mismatches to the external and internal 
debt in an environment where the exchange rates were pegged to the US dollar.  
As Chart 6 indicates, rising short-term indebtedness led to worsening 
ratios of short-term debt to central bank reserves. In 1996 this ratio was 162 









































Chart 6. Short-term debt in Asia 6 and Europe 11 as percent of total reserves in 
1994-2010 
Source: World DataBank (online), TradingEconomics.com (online), ADB-SDBS Online (for Korea) 
and Croatian National Bank Bulletin 
 
Such unfavorable ratios were clear indicators of the dramatic state of 
their external foreign currency liquidity. These developments were evidence that 
trying to provide domestic liquidity while defending a currency peg is bound to 
lead to loss of reserves. Moreover, the dynamic of capital flows in the region 
changed considerably resulting in net capital outflows of around 12 percent of the 
combined GDPs of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (Asian 
Development Outlook, 1999). 
The crisis was set off by speculative attacks on the Thailand's bakht in 
1997 and quickly spread to other Asian emerging economies, whose currencies 
also collapsed. Only Hong Kong and China managed to protect their currencies 
by intervening directly in the stock market (Hong Kong) or by immediately 
imposing capital controls (China). The result of the asset values having declined 
seriously relative to liabilities, coupled with the disappearance of foreign credit 
which followed immediately, caused the non-performing loan ratios to increase 
dramatically and most banks had to be recapitalized by their governments. That 
led to big government deficits and the need for the IMF involvement.  
The IMF hands-on involvement was based on the assumptions that 
reckless monetary and fiscal expansion together with structural weaknesses in 
corporate governance and the financial system were at the core of the Asian 
financial crisis. The IMF sponsored reforms called for tight monetary policy with 
high interest rates to restore investors' confidence, stop capital outflows, and 
stabilize the currencies. Tighter fiscal policies recommended by the IMF had the 
goal to facilitate current account adjustments and create funds necessary to 
recapitalize the insolvent banks. Both sets of reforms met with a great deal of 
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criticism and not all countries followed strictly all recommendations. Structural 
reforms were aimed at correcting domestic weaknesses in the crisis affected 
countries. They involved a number of measures designed to contract, consolidate, 
and restructure affected financial systems, particularly banking. Insolvent 
financial institutions were suspended or closed, which in some cases like 
Indonesia caused public panic. Reforming domestic financial systems and 
equipping them with adequate prudential regulation and supervision was an 
imperative in bringing the Asian economies back up on their feet. Also, there is 
clear tendency in the region towards greater exchange rate flexibility although the 
diversity in the exchange rate regimes persists.  
Growth rates in the Asian emerging economies are high again, higher 
than anywhere in the world, in spite of the recent global financial crisis of 2008-
09. Their investment-driven and export-oriented growth policy was successful in 
the aftermath of their financial crisis to a large extent because the environment on 
the world market was such that it could absorb their exports. With the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09 and the recession that ensued, the world export 
markets shrunk. That lowered the exports of Asian economies thereby slowing 
down their growth to some extent and creating the need to rethink growth 
strategies in smaller Asian emerging economies as well as in such large ones as 
China and India. The new situation on the world market is also negatively 
affecting the European emerging economies that are still struggling with the 
consequences of the recent crisis. 
 
 
4. REFLECTIONS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS ON THE EUROPEAN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 
As was shown in Charts 1-5 both Asian and European emerging 
economies shared some general macroeconomic characteristics in their pre-crisis 
periods. Both groups of countries experienced high GDP growth rates, current 
account deficits, pegged exchange rates, and massive private foreign capital 
inflows. However, the ways in which foreign capital entered both regions was 
different and that determined its impact on those economies. In European 
emerging economies the volatility of capital flows proved more important for the 
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Chart 7. Composition of total capital inflows in Europe 11 in 1994-2010 as % GDP 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, April 2012  
 
Capital flows to the European emerging economies played a significant 
role in financing their growth as was reflected in its maturity structure (Chart 7). 
Because of the non-existing financial markets during the first years of their 
transition to a market economy, foreign capital entered those economies largely 
through mergers and acquisitions or taking other forms of foreign direct 
investment. Equity flows were more prominent than debt flows although banks 
there also borrowed short-term on international capital markets. In the absence of 
impressive domestic savings in emerging European economies, foreign savings 
made up a big part of the gross fixed capital formation in those countries creating 
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Chart 8. Share of FDI in Gross Fixed Capital Formation in % in Asia 6 and 
Europe 11 
Source: own calculation based on IMF-IFS & IMF-WEO, April 2012 
 
In the years before global crisis, namely 2001-2007 growth dynamics 
between individual European emerging market economies was uneven. For 
instance, the highest growth recorded in the 2001-2007 period in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania was dramatically reversed in opposite direction in 2008 and 2009: 
those countries recorded the largest negative GDP growth comparing to the rest 
of observed countries, varying from -6 % (Lithuania) to - 10,5% (Latvia). Other 
countries recorded a moderate fall in GDP, while Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and 
the Slovak Republic continued with slow but positive growth. Over the period 
2001-2007 the European emerging economies grew at an average rate of 7 
percent.   
With the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008, the economic growth 
in overheated emerging European market economies dropped significantly. 
However, as Chart 9 shows, not all countries showed the same sensitivity: some 
countries reacted more strongly, for instance the Baltic states, and others, like 
Poland, had to endure more modest hardships. In 2009, Hungary's output dropped 
6,7 percent. In Slovenia the drop was 8,1 while in Romania it was 7,1 percent. 
The countries experiencing the largest decline were the Baltic states. The leader 
in output loss was Latvia with an 18 percent decline followed by Lithuania and 
Estonia with 14,7 and 13,9 percent decline respectively. The only country that 
experienced no negative growth in spite of the financial crisis was Poland. In 
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Chart 9. Real growth of GDP in Europe 11 in 1994-2010 (period averages) 
Source: IMF - IFS database 
 
Even the EU growth rates slipped into the negative territory by 2 percent. 
China’s growth slowed down by less than 2 percent and continued in an almost two 
digit positive territory. During their financial crisis, the AEEs lost on average almost 8 
percent of their output but their recovery was “V” shaped, rapid and sustained. 
Due to the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 the share of investment in 
GDP in many European emerging economies declined. The majority of key foreign 
investors postponed or cancelled planned investments in the EEE area. Government 
investment also declined due to the need to reduce huge budget deficits in those 
countries. That, in turn, increased gross external debt. 
Chart 10. Gross External debt (in % GDP) in EEE 2000-2009 
Source: WIIW Handbook on Statistics, CNB for Croatia, Trading Economics.com for China 
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As Chart 10 shows, in spite of the case of negative GDP growth in 2008 
and 2009 in the majority of EEE, external borrowing continued. Since its rate was 
higher than GDP growth rate, that resulted in increasing the share of external debt 
in GDP and, consequently, in worsening of the sovereign rating grade. 
The average share of household consumption in EEE countries and 
Croatia was quite high comparing with China and other Asian emerging 
economies. In majority of cases household consumption was the main driver of 
GDP growth of EEE countries and Croatia, what is consequently reflected in high 
current account deficits and external debt of those countries (Chart 11). 
 
Chart 11. Household Consumption Expenditure (in % of GDP) 
Source: IMF-IFS, March 2012 
 
The natural response of most EEEs was a reduction in the household 
consumption component of the GDP. The share of government consumption in 
GDP fell somewhat in Bulgaria but in the majority of EEE government 
consumption share rose reflecting the lack of commitment of governments to 
implement serious cuts on the expenditure side of the state budget in the face of a 
GDP decline (Chart 12). Many governments in EEE, where the GDP growth was 
consumption driven in 2001-2007 period, have tried to maintain the consumption 
component as a source of growth even during the recession.  
In the same period 2001-2009 household consumption in China was 
relatively modest at around one third of GDP, which is noticeably lower than in 
the European emerging  economies while its government consumption, although 
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Chart 12. Government Consumption Expenditure (in % of GDP) 
Source: IMF-IFS, March 2012 
 
With the investment contributing to about one half of China's growth, it 
can be said that its growth strategy has been largely investment-driven.  
The global financial crisis brought about needed current account 
adjustments for some European emerging economies even though they happened 
for the „wrong reasons“, namely through a reduction of imports due to the 
reduced purchasing power of citizens and the postponement of huge infrastructure 
projects based on imported intermediate and investment goods. A rising 
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Chart 13. Net exports of goods and services (in % of GDP) 
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The reduction of imports and mild improvements of exports of EEE also 
resulted in the lowering of the current account deficit in EEE in 2008 and 2009. 
The “internal devaluation” in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, countries mostly 
affected by the global financial crisis, increased their cost competitiveness and 
turned their large current account deficits into surpluses. A huge reduction of 
imports vis-à-vis exports also contributed to this outcome. Croatia reduced its 
current account deficit to 5,5 percent in 2009, but at the same time, the budget 
deficit increased.  
Current account surplus in Asian emerging economies was significantly 
reduced in 2008 and 2009, but other key aspects of its economy remained 
unchanged. In addition to the low household consumption, reliance on 
investment, and net export to drive their growth   gave rise to significant current 
account surpluses and, consequently, low levels of gross external debt as percent 
of GDP. 
Regarding exchange rate regimes, the European emerging economies 
pursued different models.  For instance, some countries like Poland and the 
Czech Republic had pure floats. Until November 2008 Hungary had a banded 
exchange rate. Bulgaria and the Baltic countries operated currency boards. 
Consequently, currency mismatches that developed in the European emerging 
economies were the result of different forces. While in Asia pegged exchange 
rates induced borrowers to ignore the currency risks and easily take on short-term 
loans denominated in foreign currency, in Europe taking foreign exchange 
denominated loans was encouraged by the trust in the continuing convergence 
process that will ensure a lasting appreciation of the local currency via-a-vis  that 
of the trading partner.   
The exchange rate depreciations in European emerging economies due 
to the 2008-09 crisis were mild in comparison to the exchange rate depreciations 
that happened in Asia as a result of the Asian financial crisis. The Asian 
currencies lost in real terms over 40 percent of their value. In Europe that number 
is under 20 percent and many currencies remained at stronger levels than their 
long run average. Also some of the European emerging economies are members 
of the euro-zone and use the euro as their currency. In terms of the 
macroeconomic policy trilemma, they gave up exchange rate flexibility. 
 
 
5. LESSONS FROM ASIA 
 It has now been decades that sound policies, effective governments, and 
openness to foreign trade and new technologies in Asian emerging economies led 
to their sustained rapid economic growth. It has resulted in raising living 
standards and alleviation of poverty in those countries. In addition, it led to a new 
balance in global economic power by producing a shift between advanced and 
emerging economies. It is mostly the Asian emerging economies who are 
responsible for that shift. The European emerging economies are still struggling 
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with the effects of the latest global 2008-09 crisis and recession that followed. 
The current crisis in the eurozone adds to the uncertainty. 
 It is, therefore, useful to examine the Asian experiences, especially since 
the pre-crises structures and situations were in some major aspects remarkably 
similar. In addition to the general aspects, in this paper we focus in particular on 
the scale of capital  that flew into both the Asian and the European emerging 
economies, its composition, and the consequences and effects of its volatility on 
economic performance of the countries that received it.   
The massive capital flows that during the past two decades entered the 
Asian and European emerging economies brought with them both the benefits but 
also the seeds of destruction at the time of their sudden reversal. High growth 
rates in both regions were accompanied with credit boom leading to high 
liquidity, asset price bubbles, appreciation of currencies, and other indicators that 
a crisis would be imminent. The composition of capital flows showed higher ratio 
of short term debt in the case of Asian and equity investment in the case of the 
European emerging economies (Kawai - Lamberte, 2010). Consequently, the 
main sources of instability for Asian countries were the currency and maturity 
mismatches in the external debt largely denominated in foreign currency. In the 
case of the emerging European economies it was the fact that their rapid growth 
was to a large extent financed through cross-border capital flows.  
 The first resolution came with the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 that 
did a lot of damage to some Asian emerging economies, most notably Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Eichengreen, 2003). However, their recovery 
was quick and the resumption of growth took the shape of a „V“. High growth 
rates resumed almost immediately after the crisis and reasonable stability returned 
to the region.  Sharp real exchange depreciations and an export oriented economic 
structure formed a big part of the quick recovery that was helped by the favorable 
environment on the world market. However, another important component were 
policy actions carried out by local governments and structural reforms primarily 
those aimed at stabilizing the financial system. It is those latter aspects of the 
Asian successful recovery that deserve attention from the troubled European 
emerging economies trying to recover from the global financial crisis of 2008-09. 
 Rapid recovery and the „V“ shape growth of the Asian emerging 
economies suggest that they were also quick to draw lessons from their own 
experience. Today their current accounts show surpluses, foreign capital flows in 
again, and there is a significant pool of international central bank reserves. At the 
end of 2008 Asian emerging market economies had more than a half of the 
world's total reserves to protect themselves from any sudden capital flow 
reversals in the future. The open economy policy trilemma is solved by 
moderation on all three ends, exchange rate regimes, monetary policy, and 
openness of the capital account. Comprehensive structural reforms introduced 
modern prudential regulation and supervision of the financial systems that were 
sorely missing in the period before the crisis. The Asian emerging economies 
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barely felt the global financial crisis 2008-09. Moreover, it was their growth that 
pulled the world economy out of recession following the recent crisis. 
The Asian growth model is investment and export driven, with a large 
proportion of investment financed by domestic savings. The growth in the 
European emerging economies has been consumption driven and largely 
dependent on external financing. In order to soften the considerable global 
imbalances that resulted, both models need to converge to each other. There had 
been a lot of talk about rebalancing the drivers of growth especially in China but 
another rebalancing only with a different sign is necessary in the European 
emerging economies.    
In addition to growth rebalancing, an important policy option is to make 
fiscal policy countercyclical to be in the position to use public finance to revive 
growth in difficult times. Currently the European emerging economies are so 
much under heavy burden of both external and internal debt that this policy 
option is painfully lacking. What is pursued in most of them are the austerity 
measures that are supposed to induce growth.   
 Even though they can learn from it, the European emerging economies 
can not simply emulate the Asian experience. In spite of the fact that there were 
many similarities in the economic structures of both regions before their own 
crises, there are other aspects of the world economy that are different now. For 
instance, after the global crisis 2008-09 the international environment is no longer 
conducive to large external demand for goods from the European emerging 
economies. Also the international financial system has been significantly 
weakened. 
 An additional challenge to the European emerging economies and their 
growth prospects is the current eurozone sovereign debt crisis. It is once again 
threatening the stability of European banks largely exposed to the huge external 
debt of some of the EU periphery countries. The eurozone crisis is likely to 
further hurt the Europe 11's exports and growth. It is also producing additional 





In conclusion it can be said that, with intense flows of international 
capital across borders following capital account liberalizations in many countries, 
the problem of financial and economic crises has grown more acute. That is 
especially the case when the financial authorities of countries involved lack the 
proper network of financial development and regulation. The observed cases in 
the emerging Europe and Asia both prove that point.  
 However, through one recent crisis after another in the world markets 
and the restructuring they inevitably inspire, global imbalances got spontaneously 
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somewhat reduced and further convergence in growth models is likely to happen. 
In the light of this, when one tries to assess what general and specific lessons 
European emerging economies and, for that matter the rest of the world as well, 
can draw from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and measures undertaken to 
fight it, it appears that they are twofold. On the global level, it highlighted several 
important aspects of the world economy that needed special attention. In addition 
to the need to reassess and strengthen the world financial architecture it is to 
focus attention on how to identify and utilize crisis indicators in order to prevent 
full blown crises form happening as well as how to successfully manage capital 
accounts and their liberalization. Managing capital flows in a financially highly 
integrated world is one of the most pressing issues in efforts to prevent the 
destabilizing effects of large swings in capital inflows and of their unfavorable 
composition. On a country level, however, the Asian experience suggests that 
productivity growth coupled with open markets and a high savings rate to finance 
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VOLATILNOST TOKOVA KAPITALA U RASTUĆIM 




U posljednjim desetljećima prošloga i početkom ovoga stoljeća niske kamatne 
stope u razvijenim gospodarstvima pridonijele su masovnom dotoku privatnog 
kapitala diljem svijeta u potrazi za višim stopama za investicije. Rastuća tržišna 
gospodarstva u Europi postala su atraktivna destinacija za značajne količine tog 
kapitala, osobito izravnih inozemnih ulaganja, s obzirom na njihove političke i 
gospodarske reforme, uključujući otvaranje i liberalizaciju njihovih kapitalnih 
računa. Zatvaranje jaza između domaće štednje i investicija u zemljama s 
izravnim inozemnim investicijama pomoglo je poboljšati rast tih gospodarstava. 
Ipak, to je pridonijelo stvaranju velikih deficita tekućih računa. Globalna 
financijska i gospodarska kriza 2008.-2009. promijenila je čimbenike poticanja u 
razvijenim gospodarstvima te su se prethodno obilni tokovi kapitala u rastućim 
europskim gospodarstvima značajno usporili. To je odmah utjecalo na stopu 
rasta, ali su deficiti tekućih računa ostali veliki.           
Cilj rada je istražiti kako su rastuća europska gospodarstva reagirala na naglo 
zaustavljanje međunarodnih tokova kapitala i koje su posljedice. Pogledat ćemo 
azijska gospodarstva koja su ojačala nakon svoje financijske krize 1997.-1998.,  
imaju trajne suficite na tekućim računima i postala su glavni vjerovnici u svijetu. 
Analiza se temelji na MMF-ovim bazama podataka Svjetskog i Regionalnog 
gospodarskog pregleda, Eurostatu, izvorima Azijske banke za razvoj i podacima 
nacionalnih banki u europskim zemljama.       
Ključne riječi: međunarodni tokovi kapitala, financijska liberalizacija, rastuća 
tržišna gospodarstva, globalne neravnoteže   
JEL klasifikacija: F30, F32, F43, O16, P33 
 
